This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
Only negotiable paper can be indorsed, in the technical and legal sense of this word; and an indorsement can be made only by the original payee or by some one who is made payee by indorsement to him. But not unfrequently a stranger to the note writes his name on the back, and then the question arises what is his relation to the note. On this point we have already stated that there is a singular diversity in the decisions of different States.1 In some he is held as a joint promisor or surety, (tt) 2
(tt) In Massachusetts, Baker v. Briggs, v. Phillips, 7 Gray, 284 ; Draper v. Weld, 8 Pick. 122, 130; Tenny v. Prince, 4 id. 13 id. 580; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 385; Austin v. Boyd, 24 id. 64; Hawkes 504. In this last case the previous cases when accepted, wrote an indorsement in the name of P. & Co., and discounted them with the plaintiff bank, which debited the amount of the bills to the defendants' account. It was held by the House of Lords, reversing the decision of both courts below, that the defendants were liable on their acceptances, and the bank might charge them with the bills.
In Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, the plaintiffs, a firm of lawyers, having a real estate department, received money from clients and invested it in mortgages. A clerk, B., had charge of this business. B. made fictitious mortgages, which he delivered to the lenders, and in accordance with data furnished by B., the cashier of the firm wrote checks payable to the order of the supposed borrower, and a member of the firm then signed them. Some of the payees named were real persons, some were not. B., having obtained possession of the checks, indorsed the name of the payee named in each case, and the defendant bank paid them and debited the firm's account with the amount of them. It was held that the bank was not discharged by such payment.
In England, the Bills of Exchange Act § 7 (3) provides that "where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to bearer."
In New York, by statute, notes made payable to the order of a fictitious person have, if negotiated by the maker, the same validity " as against the maker, and all persons having knowledge of the facts as if payable to bearer." 1 R. S. 768.
In Armstrong v. National Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, the plaintiff drew a check on the defendant bank payable to the order of B., and delivered it to G. in exchange for a note purporting to be made by B., whose agent G. represented himself to be. B. was a fictitious person, and G., after writing B.'s name on the back of the check, collected the amount from the defendant. Held, that the defendant could not charge the plaintiff's account with the amount of the check, cf. Blodgett v. Jackson, 40 N. H. 21 ; Bull's Head Bank v. McFeeters, 41 N. Y. Super. 215.
If the drawer or maker of a bill or note intends to make it payable to a particular person, who is impersonating another, and the bill or note is drawn payable to him in his assumed name, he may by indorsing his assumed name transfer title. Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360; Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231. See also Dodge v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234, 30 Ohio St. 1.
1 See note 1, ante * 245.
2 But the rule of Union Bank v. Willis, supra, does not apply where the note is payable to the maker's own order, and there can be only a promise to pay such person, as the maker himself makes the bearer or indorsee, Stoddard v. Penniman, 108 Mass. 366, 370; or if when negotiated the maker's name appears first on the back of the note, Dubois v. Mason, 127 Mass. 37. - K.
in others as a guarantor, (fa) in others as an indorser. (tv) In most of the States the effect of such indorsement depends on the intention of the parties, which may be shown by evidence; (tw) on this subject in Massachusetts are carefully reviewed. Maine, Irish v. Cutter, 31 Me. 536; Leonard v. Wildes, 36 id. 265; Malbon v. Southard, id. 147; Childs v. Wyman, 44 id. 433; Adams v. Hardy, 32 id. 339. Vermont, Nash v. Skinner, 12 Vt. 219; Sylvester v. Downer, 20 id. 355. New Hampshire, Martin v. Boyd, 11 N. H. 3S5. Missouri, Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 440; Lewis v. Harvey, 18 id. 74; Perry v. Barret, id. 140; Schneider v. Schiffman, 20 id. 571. South Carolina, Stoney v. Beaubien, 2 McMullen, 313; Baker v. Scott, 5 Rich. 305; Carpenter v. Oaks, 10 id. 17. In Louisiana, such party is regarded as a surety. McGuire v. Bosworth, 1 La. An. 248;" Penny v. Parham, id. 274. The principle upon which one not the payee signing negotiable paper in blank upon the back of it is charged as a promisor, if be does this at the time the note is made, is stated by Mr. Justice Parker, in Moies v. Bird, 11 Mass. 436, 440.
(tu) As in Illinois, Webster v. Cobb, 17 Ill. 459; Klein v. Currier, 14 id. 237; Carroll v. Weld, 13 id. 682; Camden v. Mc-Kov, 3 Scam. 437; Cushman v. Dement, id.'497; Smith v. Finch, 2 id. 321. In Ohio, Robinson v. Abell, 17 Ohio, 36; Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio St. 415. In Kansas, Firman v. Blood, 2 Kan. 496. In Texas, Carr v. Rowland, 14 Tex. 275; Cook v. Southwick, 9 id. 615. In Virginia, Watson v. Hurt, 6 Gratt. 633. In Connecticut, Clark v. Merriam, 25 Conn. 576; Beckwith v. Angell, 6 id. 315; Perkins v. Catlin, 11 id. 213; Ranson v. Sherwood, 26 id. 437. These cases in Connecticut hold that such indorsement in blank prima facie implies a contract on the part of the indorser that the note is due and payable according to its tenor, that the maker shall be of ability to pay it when it comes to maturity, and that it is collectible by the use of due diligence. In Pennsylvania, it is held, that, where a negotiable note is indorsed by one not a party to it, the presumption from the paper is, that he indorsed as second indorser for the accommodation of the prior parties, and no liability would attach to him so long as the note remains in the hands of the payee; but when made at the request of the payee, who acts upon the faith of it, it imparts a guaranty. Schollenberger v. Nehf, 28 Penn. St. 189. The rule adopted in Ohio differs from that which prevails in Massachusetts in this, that in the former State a stranger indorsing in blank is presumed to be a guarantor; in the latter State he is pre sumed to be an original promisor. But in Ohio such person may be charged as maker upon proof that his indorsement was made at the time of execution by the other party, or if afterward, that it was in pursuance of an agreement or intention that be should become responsible from the date of the execution. In Massachusetts, the indorsement is presumed to have been made at the time of the execution of the note; so that the difference in fact is only one as to the presumption of the time of the indorsement, though it has nut been so stated in the Ohio decision. See Greenough v. Smead, supra.
 
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