This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
and certainly would be of difficult application, if not in itself unreasonable. And now it seems to be quite well settled, that no mere payment of money will take the case out of the statute, (c) The reason is, that for any loss sustainable by such payment, damages recoverable at law are an adequate remedy. The same reason, perhaps, applies to all those acts of quasi ownership which are less than taking possession: such as surveying the estate; making out abstracts of .title, and delivering them; negotiating for the sale of it; valuing stock or land, or the like, (d) In a late case, however, in New York, which seems to have been well considered, it was held, that a mere payment of money was enough to take the case out of the statute, if it was made under such circumstances as would prevent the repayment of the money from restoring the plaintiff to his former position, (e)
It would, indeed, seem that the courts of equity in this country are tending to this test of the question, whether there has been a part performance of the contract, - namely, Has the plaintiff on the faith of the contract, entered upon the fair and honest execution of it, and so conducted himself that he cannot be replaced in his original position, and indemnified by any reasonable recovery of mere damages ? This would seem to be an equitable and reasonable rule of itself; but it would seem almost as clearly to be an evasion, if not a violation, of the law, when the contract related to any " interest in lands," and was not in writing.
* The reason frequently given for the rule that part performance takes a case from the statute - that, where there is some performance, permission to the defendant to stop there would operate as a fraud on the plaintiff (f) - resolves itself
(c) Clinan d. Cooke, 1 Sch. & L 40, 42; 1 Sugd. V. & P. c. 3, § 7; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 760; Townsend v. Houston, I Harring. (Del) 532; Crabill v Marsh, 38 Ohio St. 331; Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 113; Townsend v. Fenton, 30 Minn. 528; 32 Minn. 482. The rule that payment of the consideration is not part performance of coarse has not application unless the consideration be money. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. 279.
(d) Pembroke v. Thorpe, 3 Swanst 437, n.; Frame o. Dawson, 14 Ves. 386; Cooth v. Jackson, 6 id. 12; Whithread v. Brockhnrst, 1 Bro. Ch. 412; Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 id 559; Redding v Wilkes, 3 id. 400. Bat in Child v. Comber, 3 Swanst. 423, n , payment of fees to counsel, drawing drafts and engrossing them, and providing the purchase money by the plaintiff, were held a sufficient part performance.
(e) Malins v Brown, 4 Comst 403.
(f) Mitf. PL 265. 2 Story, Eq Jur §759 And Lord Cranworth, Ch, in Morgan v. Milman, 3 De G , M. & G. 33, assigned this as the ground of the inter-ference of equity, and considered it to be extremely doubtful whether the principle was applicable to the case where a parol contract is attempted to be en* forced against a remainder-man. With respect to which, see also Lowry v. Dufferin, 1 Irish Eq. 281. Sir William Grant, in Frame v. Dawson, 14 Ves 386, gave the following definition: "It is necessary therefore, to show a part performance; that is, an act unequivocally referring to, and resulting from, the agreement, and such that the party would suffer an injury amounting to fraud by the refusal to execute that agreement." into this, that a court of equity will set aside the statute of frauds, when, if applied, it would work or protect a fraud, or do the plaintiff the great wrong of leaving him as the mere trespasser without any legal excuse whatever for his entry upon land under a bargain with the owner, and perhaps an expenditure on it which would be for the owner's profit But this seems to be somewhat inconclusive. If carried out, it might undoubtedly prevent much mischief and detriment which occasionally result from this law. But there is no rule of law, no statutory provision, of which a similar thing may not be said. The better reason seems to be this, that a part performance is in fact an execution of the contract, but an imperfect one, and needs the interposition of the court to compel those acts which are required to make the execution complete and as beneficial to the plaintiff as it should be. The plaintiff actually asks not for an execution of the contract, but, stating that it has been executed in a partial and imperfect manner, asks that those things should be done which this imperfect execution requires in order to make it that which the parties contemplated, and the justice of the cause requires, (g) * This reason would perhaps cover a great number of cases in which specific performance of contracts, avoided by the statute of frauds, has been decreed on the ground of a part performance; as where a defendant receives the land delivered to him under a contract, and builds upon it; sells his own homestead to pay for the new one, and removes his family to it, or, by some sacrifice, raises money to pay off a charge upon the estate which he occupies by delivery from the seller.1 If equity goes
(g) See Treat, of Eq. book 1, c. 3, § 9: and also Stockier v. Stockley, I Ves. & B. 23, a case of a family compromise, acquiesced in for a considerable period. In a case where the plaintiff has laid oat money, or otherwise makes out a case of part performance, the court will endeavor, with especial earnestness, to collect, if it can, what the terms of the agreement were, althongh the plaintiff has failed to establish them with perfect precision. Lord Cottenham, L. C, Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 Mylne & C. 177; Butler v. Powis, 2 Col-Iyer, 161. Thus, where an agreement for a lease provided that the rent should be appointed by arbitrators, and they, in consequence of the landlord's refusal to enter into bonds to abide by the award, failed to fix the rent, but the tenant though he paid no rent, went into possession and made expenditures upon the faith of the agreement, on a bill filed by the tenant, Sir William Grant, M. R., held, that, as the contract was in part performed, the court must find some means of completing the execution; and it was referred to the Master to ascertain what rent should be paid. Gregory v. Mighell, 18 Ves. 328. See Boardman v Mostyn, 6 Ves. 470,471; Attorney-General v. Day, I Ves. Sen. 221 ;, Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Smale & G. 184, 19 Eng, L. & Eq. 546; Maynell v. 8urtees, 31 id. 475, 492, by the Lord Chancellor; Devonshire v. Eglin, 14 Beav. 530; Robinson c. Kettletas, 4 Edw. Ch. 67. And in Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 14 Johns. 15, a majority of the Court of Errors of New York, reversing the decision of Chancellor Kent (I Johns. Ch. 273), allowed their Inclinations to find the terms of a contract in a case of partial performance to carry them very far.
 
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