1 A vendor's lien may be abandoned during the performance of a contract by his actual parting with the goods before payment. Johnson v. Farnum, 56 Ga. 144. A sale on credit is a waiver of this lien, unless there is a special agreement or usage that the goods are not to be delivered till paid for. Gregory v. Morris, 96 U. S. 619. As to the waiver of this lien by the taking of security for the price, see Re Batchelder, 2 Lowell, 245; Farmeloe v. Bain, 1 C. P. D. 445; Chambers v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 296. A vendor's lien covers the incidents of a chattel sold, as a colt with which a mare at the time of the sale is in foal. Kellogg v. Lovely, 46 Mich. 131. This lien can only be enforced by the vendor himself, and is not assignable. Small v. Stagg, 95 Hi 39. That a lien on cows extends to their offspring, see Boynton v. Braley, 54 Vt. 92. - K.

2 The seller and buyer of personal property mar contract for alien, good, as between themselves, after delivery, which otherwise would be lost by a voluntary and unconditional delivery to the buyer. Gregory v Morris, 96 U. S. 619. - K.

Neither an agreement made by the vendor, at the time of the sale, to store for Tent, or rent free, nor the giving an order for delivery from his own store, as between him and the vendee, destroys the lien. (f) But if the goods be in the hands of a third person, he becomes, by the delivery order from the vendor, the agent of the vendee, and his possession is that of the vendee. (g)1 If a person sell goods on credit, and the vendee subsequently deposit them with the vendor to be sold on his account, the vendor will have no lien for the vendee's debt to him. (h)

A vendor's lien may be distinguished from his right of stoppage in transitu by the fact of possession in the former case, and non-possession in the latter. Hence the right of stoppage, if strictly considered, is not so much a lien as a right to acquire a lien, under particular circumstances, by resuming possession of the goods before they have come to the actual possession of the insolvent vendee. The right of stoppage in transitu was originally an equitable right, and is much more modern than the vendor's right of lien, which is strictly and entirely a common-law right (i) In the payment of the money and securities revested the property in the goods in the debtor, without any redelivery of the goods, and if the first transaction was a sale and delivery of the goods, then the subsequeut arrangement was a resale, and the delivery of a part was, in effect, a delivery of the whole. In either case the plaintiff had no lien upon the goods, and judgment must be given for the defendant.

(c) Ex parte Gwynne, 12 Ves. Jr 379.

(d) Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568, 1 Nev. & M. 229, Miles v Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504.

(c) Payne v. Shadbolt, 1 Camp. 427; Palmer v. Hand, 13 Johns. 434.

(f) Townlev v. Crump, 5 Nev & M. 606, 1 Har. & W. 564.

(g) Miles v. Gorton, 2 C R. & M. 504.

(h) Houghton v Matthews, 3 B & P 485.

(i) Whitaker on Lien, 151; Cross, id. 2.

1 The indorsement and transfer of a dock warrant, warehouse certificate, or other like document of title, by a seller to a purchaser, is not such a delivery of possession as divests the vendor's lien. Meyerstein v Barber, L. R. 2 C. P. 38, 361; 4 App. Cas. 317, Glyn a East & West India Dock Co. 5 Q. B. D. 129; Gunn v. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. 491. In California, a transfer of a warehouse receipt passes the title to the transferee without notice to the warehouseman. Davis v. Russell, 52 Cal. 611. -K.

our chapter on this subject, we have considered the question, whether the right of stoppage in transitu should be regarded as a right of rescission of the sale, or as an extension or peculiar application of the common-law lien of a vendor; and have given our reasons and authorities for decidedly preferring the latter view.

The factor's lien is both particular and general. Factors have always had a common-law lien upon the goods of their principals, coming into their possession, for the charges incidentally arising upon those goods in the course of their business. And since the case of Kruger v. Wilcox, decided in England in 1755, their right to a general lien for the balance due upon * all goods of the principal, in their possession, has been established as resulting from the usages of trade, (j)1 Possession by the factor is, however, essential, whether the lien asserted be general or particular. (k)2 This lien not only covers money advanced, and regular charges, but also debts of the principal for which the factor is surety. The lien attaches upon the factor's becoming surety, which is regarded as the same thing as though he had lent his principal the money. (l) If, however, he becomes responsible

(j) Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambl. 252. In this case the Lord Chancellor, Hardwicke, says. "All the four merchants, both in their examination in the cause and now in court, agree that, if there is a course of dealings and general account between the merchant and factor, and a balance is due to the factor, he may retain the ship and goods, or produce, for such balance of the general account, as well as for the charges, customs, etc, paid on the account of the particular cargo."

(k) Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Yes. Jr. 280; Walker v. Birch, 6 T. R. 258; Baker v. Fuller, 21 Pick. 318; Elliot p. Bradbury, 23 Vt. 217; Bk. of Rochester v Jones, 4 Comst. 497.

(l) Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 251; Hammonds v. Barkley, 2 East, 227. The defendants in this case were assignees of the estate of a bankrupt factor, to whom the testator of the plaintiffs had consigned a ship and cargo, for which the factor was largely in advance, by payment of insurance premium, ship's expenses, and by accepting bills. The testator died before the ship sailed, but the plaintiffs, as executors, upon application of the captain for instructions, confirmed her destination to the charge of the factor. The ship was sold, and the freight collected by the factor, and the proceeds were held by his assignees as a part of the assets of his estate. The for his principal without the authority or knowledge of the latter, he will have no lien upon the property in his hands for such responsibility, (m) The lien of a factor has always been favored by the courts as being for the interests of commerce, and the right has consequently been allowed' to be carried to a very great extent. Thus, a factor, who has sold under a del credere commission, or if in advance for the goods sold, by actual payment, is allowed to have a lien upon the * price in the hands of the purchaser, though he has parted with the possession of the goods. His right to retain the money in consequence of his lien, is put upon the ground of his control over the fund by the power of giving a discharge, or bringing an action, (n)