This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
(h) Bright v. Sneff, 5 B. & Ald. 350; Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42. See Farrell v. Richmond, etc. R. R. Co. 102 N. C 390.
(i) Yorke v. Grenangh, 2 Ld. Raym. 867, per Holt, C. J.; Whitaker on Lien, 92; Cross, id. 286.
(j) Fitch v. Newbury, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1.
(k) Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 137. This was an action of replevin for six
1 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. American Oil Works, 126 Pa. 485; Bacharach v. Chester Freight Line, 133 Pa. 414.
2 A common carrier does not forfeit his lien by depositing, in his own name with a warehouseman subject to his lien for freight, goods, undelivered through the consignee's fault Western Trans. Co. v. Barber, 56 N. Y. 544. - K.
3 "If one person takes another's goods from his possession tortiously, or without his consent express or implied, and sends them by a carrier, it is well settled that the carrier must look to the one who employed him, and has no legal claim or lien for freight as against the owner. In cases of doubt, the carrier must protect himself by requiring payment in advance. But it seems to be the rule of common sense and supported by the weight of authority that when the owner has, by his own voluntary acts, clothed the sender with an apparent authority to act for him, then the carrier has a right to look to the owner for his reasonable charges, and to hold a lien on the goods for the charges " Vaughan v. Providence, etc. R. R. Co., 13 R. I. 578. In that case, by error of one of several connecting carriers, goods were forwarded to a wrong destination, and the defendant company, on paying charges and bringing them back to the proper destination, was held entitled to a lien not only for freight on its own line, but for the charges paid to the carrier which in good faith had carried the (roods' to the wrong place. And see, to similar effect, Patten v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 29 Fed. Rep. 590; Crossan v. New York, etc R. R. Co. 149 Mass. 196,199.
* A carrier cannot sell goods for freight, of his own mere motion. (l) His delivery of some parcels of an owner's hundred bbls. of flour, bought for plaintiff by his agent in Western New York, and directed to be forwarded, via Albany, over the Western Railroad to Boston. The agent of the Canal Boat Company, which brought the flour from Western New York to Albany, instead of obeying the instructions given to him, changed the direction of the goods from Albany, so that they were sent to the city of New York, and thence shipped by the defendant's vessel to Boston. This" chance was made without the knowledge of the owner of the flour, or his agent, and the original instructions as to the way the goods were to be sent from Albany to Boston, were unknown to the intermediate carrier from Albany to New York, or to the. defendant. On the arrival of the defendant's vessel at Boston, the plaintiff demanded the flour, and the defendant refused to deliver it, claiming to have a lien thereon for his freight. The plaintiff refused to pay the freight, and commenced this action to recover the flour. The material point raised at the trial, was, whether the defendant had a lien upon the goods, they having been shipped by his vessel without the authority and contrary to the instructions of the owner. The court ruled, that if, in the absence of all knowledge on the defendant's part, of the original contract for the transportation of the flour, and acting under the belief that this was an ordinary case of transportation of goods, put into his charge by an authorized agent, he had performed the service of transportation from New York City to Boston, he would be entitled to his reasonable charges for freight, and had a lien upon the flour therefor. The case came up for consideration of the full bench, upon report of the presiding judge, and it was there determined that the ruling could not be sustained, and that if a carrier receives goods innocently from a wrongdoer, without the consent of the owner, express or implied, he cannot detain them against the true owner until the freight or carriage is paid. In giving the opinion of the court, Fletcher, J., after citing and weighing what authorities are to be found upon the question, and examining the general principles applicable to the case, proceeds to say: "Upon this settled and universal principle, that no man's property can be taken from him without his consent, express or implied, the books are full of cases, many of them hard and distressing cases, where honest and innocent persons have purchased goods of others, apparently the owners, and often with strong evidence of ownership, but who yet were not the owners, and the purchasers have been obliged to surrender the goods to the true owners, though wholly without remedy for the money paid. There are other hard and distressing cases of advances made honestly and fairly, by auctioneers and commission merchants, upon a pledge of goods by persons apparently having the right to pledge, but who in fact had not any such right, and the pledgees have been subjected to the loss of them by the claim of the rightful owner. These are hazards to which persons in business are continually exposed by the operation of this universal principle, that a man's property cannot be taken from him without his consent. Why should the carrier be exempt from the operation of this universal principle ? Why should not the principle of caveat emptor apply to him ? The reason, and the only reason given, is, that he is obliged to receive goods to carry, and should therefore have a right to detain the goods for his pay. But he is not bound to receive goods from a wrongdoer. He is bound only to receive goods from one who may rightfully deliver them to him, and he can look to the title as well as persons in other pursuits and situations in life. Nor is a carrier bound to receive goods, unless the freight or pay for the carriage is first paid to him; and he may in all cases secure the payment of the carriage in advance. In the case of King v. Richards, 6 Whart. 418, it was decided that a carrier may defend himself from a claim for goods by the person who delivered them to him, on the ground that the bailor was not the true owner, and therefore not entitled to the goods. The common carrier is responsible for the wrong delivery of goods, though innocently, done, upon a forged order. Why should not his obligation to receive goods exempt him from the necessity of determining the right of the person to whom he delivers the goods, as well as from the necessity of determining the right of the person from whom he receives the goods ? " Fitch v. Newbury, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1. And see Bates v. Staunton, 1 Duer, 79 also, Buskirk v. Purin, 2 Hall, 661; Gilson v. Gwinn, 107 Mass. 126; Stearns v. Dean, 129 Mass. 139.
 
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