(f) Dufolt v. Gorman, 1 Minn. 801.

(g) Dorrs v. Morewood, 10 Barb. 188; Henna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21.

(h) Lambard v. Pike, 88 Me. 141; Bangor v. Goding, 85 Me. 73.

(i) "The doctrine of lien originated in certain principles of the common law, by which a party, who was compelled to receive the goods of another, was also entitled to retain them for his indemnity; thus carriers and innkeepers had, by the common law, a lien on the goods entrusted to their charge." Smith, Merc. Law, 558.

(j) This question has been considerably discussed within the last few years. We have already seen that an innkeeper in such a case has a lien. See ante, p. * 156, note (u). See also Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 1, where the court say: "There is an obvious ground of distinction between the cases of carrying goods by a common carrier, and the furnishing keeping for a horse by an innkeeper. In the latter case it is equally for the benefit of the owner to have his horse fed by the innkeeper, in whose custody he is placed, whether left by the thief, or by himself or agent; in either case food is necessary for the preservation of his horse, and the innkeeper confers a benefit upon the owner by feeding him. But can it be said that a carrier confers a benefit on the owner of goods by carrying them to a place where, perhaps, he never designed, and does not wish them to go? Or as in this case is the owner of goods benefited by having them taken and transported by one trans* It is settled that when the carrier cannot find the con signee, or learns that he is a swindler, and would cheat portation line, at their own price, when he had already hired and paid another to carry them at a less price?" The first case in which the same question arose, in regard to a carrier, is that of the Exeter carrier, cited by Lord Holt, in York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866. There it appeared that one A stole goods, and delivered them to the Exeter carrier to be carried to Exeter. The right owner finding the goods in the possession of the carrier, demanded them of him, upon which the carrier refused to deliver, without being paid for the carriage. The owner brought trover, and it was held, that the carrier might justify detaining the goods against the right owner for the carriage, for when A brought them to him he was obliged to receive them and carry them; and therefore, since the law compelled him to carry them, it would give him a remedy for the premium due for the carriage. The decision evidently met with the approval of Lord Holt. On the authority of this case, the opinion seems generally to have prevailed in the profession and among text-writers, that innkeepers and common carriers stand upon the same ground in this respect. See King v. Richards, 6 Whart. 423. But several late cases seem to have established the contrary doctrine, in this country at least, in accordance with what we have stated in the text. The first case, since that of the Exeter carrier, in which this question has been directly considered, is Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 1, already cited. In that case, the plaintiffs, by their agents, shipped goods at Port Kent, on Lake Champlain, consigned to themselves at Marshall, Michigan, care of H. C. & Co., Detroit, by the New York and Michigan line, who were common carriers, and with whom they had previously contracted for the transportation of the goods to Detroit, and paid the freight in advance. During their transit, and before they reached Buffalo, the goods came into the possession of carriers doing business under the name of the Merchants Line, without the knowledge or assent of the plaintiffs, and were by them transported to Detroit, consigned by H. P. & Co. of Buffalo to the care of the defendants, and delivered to the defendants, who were personally ignorant of the manner in which they came into the possession of the Merchants Line, and of the contract of the plaintiffs with the New York and Michigan line although they, and also H. P. & Co., were agents for and part owners in the Merchants Line. The defendants being warehousemen and forwarders, received the goods and advanced the freight upon them from Troy, N. Y., to Detroit. On demand of the goods by the plaintiffs, the defendants refused to deliver them until the freight advanced by them, and their charges for receiving and storing the goods were paid, claiming a lien on the goods for such freight and charges. The plaintiffs thereupon brought replevin; and the court, after much consideration, held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the goods without payment to the defendant of such freight and charges, and that the defendants had no lien for the same. This decision is supported by the case of Van Buskirk v. Purrington, 2 Hall, 561. There property was sold on a condition with which the buyer failed to comply, and shipped the goods on board the defendant's vessel. On the defendant's refusal to deliver the goods to the owner, he brought trover, and was allowed to recover the value, although the defendant insisted on his right of lien for the freight. See also Collman v. Collins, 2 Hall, 569 The same point arose directly in the case of Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 137, in which Fletcher, J., after reviewing and commenting upon the authorities which we have cited, says: "Thus the case stands upon direct and express authorities. How does it stand upon general principles? In the case of Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 275, it is said:'The universal and fundamental principle of our law of personal property is, that no man can be divested of his property without his consent, and, consequently, that even the honest purchaser under a defective title cannot hold against the true proprietor.' There is no case to be found, or any reason or analogy anywhere suggested in the books, which would go to show that the real owner was concluded, by a bill of lading not given by himself, but by some third person, erroneously or fraudulently. If the owner loses his property, or is robbed of it, or it is sold or pledged without his consent, by one who has only a temporary right to its use, by hiring or otherwise, or a qualified possession of it for a specific purpose, as for transportation, or for work to be done upon it, the owner can follow and reclaim it in the possession of any person, however innocent. Upon this settled and universal principle, that no man's property can be taken from him without his consent, express or implied, the books are the consignor, he is bound to protect the owner and consignor, and for that purpose to hold the goods, or store them in some proper way for his use. (k) And so he is if the consignee refuses to receive * the goods. (l) He would be bound to give notice to the consignor only, if that, under the circumstances, would be reasonable care; and this, it would seem, is a question for the jury. (m)