(g) Summers v. Ball, 8 M. & W. 596, where a deed of separation between husband and wife contained a covenant by the wife and her trustees, that she, her executors or administrators, or the trustees, or some or one of them, should and would at all times save, defend, and keep harmless and indemnified the husband from and against the debt or debts, sum or sums of money, which she the wife had then, at the time of the making of the indenture, contracted, or which she should, at any time thereafter during the separation, contract. Held, that this covenant included debts previously contracted by the wife for necessaries while living with the husband.

(h) Co. Lit. 112 a; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 89, 90; Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 545; Carter v. Carter, 14 Sm. & M. 59. He cannot convey property directly to her. Martin v. Martin, 1 Greenl, 394; Porter v. Wakefield, 146 Mass. 25; Jackson v. Parks, 10 Cush. 550, was an action of assumpsit on two promissory notes, made by the defendant's testator to the plaintiff, his wife, during coverture. The consideration of the notes was certain property which the plaintiff held in her own right, which passed to her husband. The court held that the action could not be sustained In Sweat v. Hall. 8 Vt 187, the same doctrine has been established. See also Hoker v. Baggs, 63 Ill. 161; Butler v. Ives, 139 Mass. 202; Patterson v. Patterson, 45 N. H. 164, 166. [The law on this point is changed by statute in many jurisdictions.] to separation, and is therefore wholly void. (i)! And if the covenant be in general to pay an annuity to the wife, the consideration for it being the separation, and in the nature of a continuing consideration, a subsequent reconciliation and cohabitation discharges the husband from his obligation. (j) But the agreement may be expressly to pay to her or for her use such annuity during her life, and then it is not affected by a subsequent cohabitation. (k) And it would seem, that if the annuity is expressly to be paid during the continuance of a separation by mutual consent, and the husband forfeits his marital rights by his own misconduct, he can no longer put an end to the separation, nor to his obligation to pay the annuity. (l) And if such an agreement to pay an annuity do not expressly except adultery on her part, neither that nor a divorce because of it would discharge his obligation. (m) Such is the doctrine of the English courts; and in Massachusetts, it was held where real estate was secured, the income to be paid to the wife during her life, and to her husband during his life, if he survived her, and she was divorced from him for his adultery, and afterwards died, he was still entitled to the income during his life. (mm) But it must be remembered that such divorce in England would have formerly been only (unless by act of Parliament) a mensa et thoro; whereas in this country it would be a vinculo, and thus might perhaps put an end to such obligation. There is now, however, in England, a court having full power to decree divorces a vinculo; and the rules of law hitherto applied in that court are similar to those in force in this country.

(i) Westmeath v. Salisbury, 5 Bligh (n. s.), 393; Durant v. Titley, 7 Price, 577; Hindlev v. Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547; Jones v. Waite, 9 Cl. & F. 101.

(j) Seholey v. Goodman, 1 C. & P. 36.

(k) Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad. 743. In this case Lord Tenterden, C. J., said: " I think it is impossible for us, sitting in a court of law, to say that this deed, and the bond on which the action is brought, were avoided by the reconciliation alleged in the plea. The argument for the defendant must be, that if the husband and wife had agreed to live together again, even for a few hours, and afterwards separated, all the provisions of the deed were put an end to by condonation. I think that upon this deed we cannot come to such a conclusion."

(l) Whoregood v. Whoregood, 1 Ch. Cas. 250.

(m) Baynon v. Batley, 8 Bing. 256; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547 By deed of three parts, between husband, wife, and trustee, reciting that differences existed, and that the husband and wife had agreed to live separate, the husband covenanted to pay an annuity to the wife, during so much of her life as he should live, and the trustee covenanted to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts, and that she should release all claim of jointure, dower, and thirds. Held, that this deed was legal and binding, and that a plea by the husband that the wife sued in the Ecclesiastical Court for restitution of conjugal rights, and that he put in an allegation and exhibits, charging her with adultery, and that a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro was in that cause pronounced, was not a sufficient answer to an action by the trustee for arrears of the annuity. Abbott, C. J.: "The only question is upon the sufficiency of the plea. It has been decided that a plea stating the commission of adultery by the wife, is not sufficient, upon this ground, that if the husband, when executing such a deed as this, thinks proper to enter into an unqualified covenant he must be bound by it. Had he wished to make the non-commission of adultery a condition of paying the annuity to his wife, be should have covenanted to pay it quam diu casta vixerit."

1 An indenture in which a husband agrees to pay to a trustee money for the support of his wife, made in contemplation of an immediate separation, which takes place, is not void as against public policy. Fox v. Davis, 113 Mass. 255. But a note made by a husband to a trustee for his wife in consideration that she would drop proceedings for a divorce and return and live with him as his wife, is illegal. Merrill v, Peaslee, 146 Mass. 460.

If, upon such separation, property has been settled on the wife and children for their support, it would be upheld against subsequent creditors, unless the settlement were shown to be in fraud of them, or otherwise not in good faith. (n)