This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
(t) See Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Tick. 291.
If the wife leaves the husband without just cause, and refuses * to cohabit with him, then it is certain that she loses all right to a maintenance from him. For the opposite rule would encourage a wilful breach of the marriage vow and duty, and weaken the wholesome influences which keep together those who have solemnly agreed to live together. (x) By
(u) Govier v. Hancock, 6 T. R. 603. And it has likewise been held in England that a husband is not liable to the penalty of stat. 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, § 3, for neglecting and refusing to maintain his wife, who has left him and committed adultery, although he has himself since her departure been guilty of the same crime. King v. Flintan, 1 B. & Ad. 227.
(v) Hardie v. Grant, 8 C. & P. 512. Because it is res inter alias partes.
(w) Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41. This was an action of assumpsit to recover for necessaries furnished to the defendant's wife. It appeared that the wife had formerly eloped for adultery, and been in the Magdalen Asylum; but that the defendant had afterwards taken her back. Held, that under these circumstances he was liable. Lord Kenyon said: " With respect to her having been formerly guilty of adultery, and having been in the Magdalen Asylum, though an adulterous elopement will prevent the husband from being liable for articles furnished to the wife during the term of her elopement, that is no answer now. The husband has taken her back, and she was from that time entitled to dower; she was sponte retracta, and of course entitled to maintenance during coverture, if her husband turned her out of doors." And where the husband left his wife who had been guilty of adultery, still living in his house with two children bearing his name, he was held liable for necessaries supplied her, by one who did not know the circumstances. Norton v. Fazan, 1 B. & P. 226. (x) Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 129; Brown v. Patton, 3 "Humph. 135; McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; Williams v. Prince, 3 Strob. L. 490; Allen v. Aldrich, 9 Foster (N. H.), 63; Thorne v. Kathan, 51 Vt. 520; Bevier v. Galloway, 71 Ill. 517; Schnuckle v. Bierman, 89 Ill. 454; Harttmann v. Tegart, 12 Kan. 177. - If, however, she offers to return, not having been guilty of adultery, and the husband refuses to receive her, his liability for her future necessaries is thereby revived. McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Clement v. Mattison, 3 Rich. L. 93; Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247. - And if such application is made to the husband by some third person on behalf of the wife, and he without questioning such third person's authority, puts his refusal on some other ground, it will be equivalent to a personal application by the wife the civil law also, if a wife leave her husband without his fault, he is not obliged ei aequaliter subministrare. (y) But if after deserting him she offers to return, we think his obligation to receive or maintain her must depend upon the circumstances of her separation, its length, and her conduct during the separation; thus, if she commit adultery, before or after her elopement, he is under no obligation whatever to receive her. If no sufficient objection arises from these circumstances, then he is bound to receive her; otherwise not.(z)1 And if she leaves him involuntarily, even by compulsion of law, as by imprisonment for non-payment of a fine and costs, it would seem that the husband is not discharged from his liability to maintain her.(a) We repeat, therefore, that if the wife lives separate from her husband, it is obvious, from the many questions which may be raised, that it is incumbent on one who would supply her with necessaries on the husband's credit, but without his express authority, to look cautiously into all the facts and circumstances. (b)
When the separation takes place by the consent and agreement of both parties, something of uncertainty arises, from the * conflict between the unwillingness of the law to permit and sanction such violation of marriage obligation and duty, on the one hand, (bb) and on the other its disposition to allow such a separation under circumstances which give it a color of reason, and to hold all parties to their contracts made in relation to it, so far as may be done without placing the power of a dissolution of marriage too much in the hands of the married parties. (bc) Thus, it is said by Sir William Scott, that the obligations of the marriage contract are not to be relaxed at the pleasure of one party, or at the pleasure of both. (c) And it is well settled that they cannot by any contract destroy each other's herself. McGahay v. Williams, 12 Johns. 293. So if husband and wife separate by consent, and provision is made by him for her maintenance, if the wife, during such separation, purchase necessaries, and the parties subsequently cohabit together, the husband will be liable for them. Rennick v. Ficklin, 3 B. Mon. 166; Rea v. Durkee, 25 Ill. 503.
(y) Dig. Lib. 23, Tit. 3.
(z) In Henderson v. Stringer, 2 Dana, 293, is is said: " If she offers to return, and he? without sufficient cause, refuses to receive her, his liability is revived."
(a) Bates v. Enright, Sup. Ct. of Me. 21 Law Rep. 53.
(b) See Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46.
(bb) See a strong case to this effect, Collins v. Collins, Phill. (N. C.) Eq. 153.
(bc) For recent cases arising under articles of separation, see Griflin v. Banks, 37 N. Y. 621; Hitner's appeal, 54 Penn. St. 110; Carley v. Green, 12 Allen, 104.
(c) See Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Cons. 118; Oliver v. Oliver, id. 364.
1 If, however, she returns, and he receives her, he does not become liable for her necessary support during the separation. Oinson v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 73. - K.
rights. Let the covenant of separation be never so formal or solemn, either party may at any time insist upon a restoration of all the rights which belong to the relation of marriage. (d) But if after such a deed, and a separation consequent upon it, the husband institutes proceedings to recover the society of his wife, the deed, though no bar, may still be evidence as to the character of the separation, and if this be shown to have arisen from his misconduct, either by the deed itself or otherwise, he cannot succeed. (e) Nevertheless, where such separation is made by an * instrument to which a third person is a party, and is a trustee for the wife, and the husband agrees with this trustee to give him a sufficient sum for her maintenance, such trustee may maintain an action on the agreement.(f) And if the trustee agrees to hold the husband harmless on his liability for his wife, and indemnify him against any further expenditure for her, the husband may maintain an action on such agreement. (g) Without the intervention of such third party, the * husband and wife cannot contract together, being but one person in the view of the law. (h) But such agreement must be absolute and unconditional, and not dependent upon the contingency of a future separation, nor upon the wife's future consent to live separate, for then it is regarded as an inducement
 
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