This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
But if the articles be more or better than are necessary for the wife, still the husband may be held, not upon his authority as implied by the law, but upon sufficient evidence of his express authority or assent; and for this purpose comparatively slight evidence is sufficient; and the mere fact that he saw and knew that she possessed and used the property, or even that she had ordered it, and he made no objection, may be enough for this purpose. (g) For so long as the husband lives with his wife, he is liable to any extent for goods which he distinctly permits her to purchase. That the husband may withhold his authority, and is always saved from liability by express notice *and prohibition, is perhaps more clear by the earlier authorities than by the later. It was long since decided that if the wife lives with the husband, and he prohibits a tradesman from supplying her with articles of dress, he cannot be made liable for them, because, in the language of Lord Hale, " it shall not be left to a jury to dress my wife in what apparel they think proper." (//) And this doctrine is maintained by many cases, and the rule to be
(f) It is always a question of fact for the jury whether the tradesman gives credit to the wife for articles delivered to her, and if the credit is once given to her, the husband will not be liable, although the articles may be necessary, and although the wife lives with him, and he sees her wear them without objection. Bentley v. Griffin, 5 Taunt. 356; Metcalf v. Shaw, 3 Camp. 22; Stammers v. Macomb, 2 Wend. 454; Moses v. Fog-artie, 2 Hill (S. C), 335; Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417. And see Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179; for the law does not allow a person who has once given credit to A, knowing all the facts, afterwards to shift his claim and charge B. Leggat v. Reed, 1 C. & P. 16. And wherever a married woman lives apart from her husband, having a separate estate and maintenance secured to her, there may be good ground to hold that all her debts contracted for such maintenance, and in the course of her dealings with tradesmen, are understood by both parties to he upon the credit of her separate funds for maintenance. 2 Story
Eq. § 1401. See also Owens v. Dickinson, 1 Craig & P. 48; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K. 209; N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige, 9; Gardner v. Gardner, id. 112; Smith v. Sullivan, 11 How. Pr. 368; Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558.
(g) Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120. The mere fact that the husband sees the wife wearing the goods does not vary the case, if it be shown that he disapproved of the conduct of the wife in ordering them. Atkins v. Curwood, 7 C. & P. 756. And where no express authority is shown, the extravagant nature of the wife's order is always proper to be taken into consideration by the jury, as showing that the wile had no such authority. Lane v. Ironmonger, l"> M. & W. 368; Freestone v. Butcher, 9 C. & P. 647; Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631; Seaton v. Benedict, ."> King. 28, gathered from them would seem to be, that the implied authority of the husband may always be rebutted by proof of express prohibition. We cannot but think it certain, however, that this rule would be greatly modified, at least in this country, under circumstances which distinctly required such modification. As, for instance, suppose the husband to be rich and penurious, and that he gave his wife garments enough to prevent her suffering from cold, but only of such coarse fabric or materials that she could not wear them in the street; or that from bad temper or cruelty he gave her no clothing, so that for decency's sake she was obliged to remain always in her chamber and even there suffered from cold, - we cannot doubt that the husband would be held liable in such cases, the law resting his liability, if necessary, upon an absolute presumption of his authority; as has been held in the case of his turning her out of doors without her fault. And the reason and justice of the rule would be fully satisfied if the husband, living with his wife, were held answerable for necessaries supplied to her, with or without notice of prohibition; but where there was express prohibition, then the jury should be instructed that the word " necessaries " should be construed very strictly. It is said: "The law will not presume so much ill as that a husband should not provide for his wife's necessities." (i) This should not be presumed; but when it is proved, the law should not do, nor permit, so much ill as to leave her without necessaries. The later authorities seem indeed to change, and, as we think, materially for the better, the ground upon which the liability * of the husband for necessaries furnished to the wife has hitherto rested. Generally, at least, it has been put upon her agency and his authority. Undoubtedly this has been stretched very far, and authority to contract for the husband sometimes implied from circumstances which not only suggest no rational probability of any such authority, but seem to be strongly opposed to this supposition; it sometimes appears to be a legal supposition, not only without fact, but opposed to fact. It seems, indeed, absurd to say, that a man who has driven his wife from his house and his presence, and manifested by extreme cruelty his utter hatred of her, was all the time constituting her his agent, and investing her with authority to bind him and his property. And if we suppose the case, where a wife perfectly incapacitated by infirmity of body or mind from making any contract at all, is supplied with necessaries by one who finds her driven from home and ready to perish, and who now comes to her husband for indemnity, we cannot doubt that he would recover. But the proposition would seem too absurd even to take its place among the fictions of the law, that the wife, when she received this aid, promised in the husband's name that he would pay for it, and that he had given her a sufficient authority to make this promise for him. For these and other reasons courts now show a tendency to rest the responsibility of the husband for necessaries supplied to the wife, on the duty which grows out of the marital relation. He is her husband: he is the stronger, she the weaker; all that she has is his; the act of marriage destroys her capacity to pay for a loaf with her own money; and as all she then possesses, and all she may afterwards acquire, are his during life and marriage, upon him must rest, with equal fulness, if the law would not be the absolute opposite of justice, the duty of maintaining her, and supplying all her wants according to his ability.1 And we think this plain rule of common sense and common morality is becoming a rule of the common law. (j)2
 
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