This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
(v) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 2 Cr. &M. 617. In this case it appeared that A kept an account in the nature of a banking account with the firm of 15. & Co., and annual accounts were rendered to him. During the time that A dealt with the firm, all the partners retired except C, who formed a new partnership with K. On the accession of K a large capita] was brought into the concern. A's account was then transferred from the books of the old to those of the new partnership, and the balance was struck annually as before; and A, until his death, which happened about three years afterwards, received sums on account, and interest on his balance from the new firm, in the same manner as before. Upon the death of A, his administrators brought an action against the quondam partners and C to recover the balance, and in that action the quondam partners contended that their responsibility had shifted to C and K, and it was argued in their behalf that the transfer of the account into the books of the new firm, and the payments of money to A, amounted to evidence against K that he intended to take the debt upon him. But the Court of Exchequer were of opinion that no inference of that sort could be drawn, in the absence of any proof of A's assent to the substitution of K as his debtor, for the original partners; and Bolland, B., observed further, that there was nothing to show that K undertook to answer for the debts of the old firm, and the probabilities were that he would not incur further responsibilities. And although the account was transferred from the old to the new firm, the learned judge conceived that there might be many ways in which interest might be paid without K being aware of it , and the manner of keeping the accounts Led to the supposition that he was not aware of it. See also Ex parte Sandham, 4 Deac. & C. 812; Stenburg v. Callanan, 14 Ia. 251.
(w) See Catt v. Howard, 3 Stark 5.
1 The presumption is against the assumption by an incoming partner of pre-exist' ing debts, Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Penn St. 235"; Paradise v. Gerson, 32 La. An indicating his willingness and intention to assume the old debts. (ww)
If persons who succeed to the interest of a retiring partner continue to transact the business in conjunction with the remaining partners as before, they become members of the firm as under the original articles in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (wx)
The authority of a partner to bind his firm rests indeed upon a necessity; for mercantile business could not be carried on by a partnership otherwise, without great inconvenience. And it is bounded and measured by this necessity, so that the partnership is not bound by the acts or contracts of any partner, not within the legitimate scope of the partnership business. (x) An illustration of this may be found in the rule which is neld by authorities of great weight, that one partner cannot bind his firm by a submission to arbitration, without specific authority from his copartners; nor has a partner, as such, authority to consent to a judgment in an action against him and his copartners; (y) the reason given for these rules being, that a partner has no implied authority, except so far as is necessary to carry on the business of the firm. (z) Another reason is also given, that * such implied authority might deprive the other partners of their legal rights or remedies.
So if a partner disposes of the partnership property in any manner for his personal and exclusive benefit, as by a sale on terms beneficial to himself alone, this is not valid as to the other partner without proof of his assent. (zz)
It is a familiar principle, that partners may limit or enlarge the power of each other, as between themselves, at their own pleasure; and it is certain that third persons are not affected by any such limitations or stipulations, unless they have notice or knowledge of them. (a) But whether they are bound by limitations of which they have notice, and therefore cannot hold the firm on the contract of a partner who, as they know, has exceeded the power given to him by his firm, may not be quite settled; but we think the better reason and authority lead to the conclusion that third parties are affected by such stipulations when made known to them. (b)
(ww) Updyke v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 446.
(wx) Mealier v. Cox, 37 Ala. 201.
(x) Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128; Saudilands v. Marsh, 2 B. & Ald. 673; Sims v. Brutton, 1 E. L. & E. 446. One partner cannot hind the firm or transfer its property for his private debt: Kemeys v. Richards, 11 Barb. 312; Lanier v. McCabe, 2 Fla. 32; unless the other partners authorize or ratify the act. Wheeler v. Rice, 8 Cush. 205.
(y) Hamhidge v. De la Croute, 3 M. G. & S. 742; Morgan v. Richardson, 16
Mo. 409; Binney v. Le Gal, 19 Barb. 592. See also Grier v. Hood, 25 Pa. 430; Clark v. Bowen, 22 How. 270.
(z) Stead v. Salt, 3 Bing. 101; Kart-haus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 228; Buchanan v. Curry, 19 Johns. 137; Harrington v. Higham, 13 Barb. 660; s. c. 15 id. 524. But see Wilcox v. Singletary, Wright, 420; Southard v. Steele, 3 Monr. 435; Armstrong v. Robinson, 5 G. & J. 412; Taylor v. Coryell, 12 S. & R. 243.
(zz) Cadwallader v. Kroesen, 22 Md. 200. See* 185.
532; to become so liable, he must expressly agree with the creditor to assume, Sham-burg v. Buggies, 83 Pa. 148; Meador v. Hughes, 14 Bush, 652; Morehead v. Wristow, 73 N. C. 398. See, however, Poole v. Hintrager, 60 Ia. 180; Arnold v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117. The new partner's assent to assume, and the creditor's consent to accept him, are both equally necessary, Shoemaker, etc. Co. v. Bernard, 2 Lea, 358; but very slight evidence of such assumption being sufficient, Cross v. Burlington Bank, 17 Kan. 336; Shaw v. McGregory, 105 Mass. 96. - K.
 
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