This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
1 Upon a covenant by the lessor to keep in repair the main walls, main timbers, and roofs of the demised premises, the lessor cannot be sued for non-repair, unless he has received notice of want of repair. Makin v. Watkinson, L. R. 6 Ex. 25. ( Where an insurance company allows any dividends declared to be used in reduction of annual premiums, it is the company's duty to give the insured notice of the amount of the dividends, so that he may in due time pay or tender the balance of the premium. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 80. And also where an insurance company determines to cancel an accepted risk, the insured is entitled to reasonable notice of such determination. McLean v. Republic Ins. Co. 3 Lansing, 421. If an agreement is made to pay for the construction of a bridge an amount "which should be justified by the certificate" of the engineer in charge of the work, the production of such a certificate and notice of it to the debtor are conditions precedent to a suit on the agreement. Wangler v. Swift, 90 N. Y. 38. As to a preliminary notice to a purchaser before taking away a sowing machine, sold with an option in the seller to so withdraw it in default of payment, see Wheeler, etc. Co. v. Teetslaff, 53 Wis. 211. - But notice that the plaintiff has acted in the knowledge and on the faith of an offer of reward is not a condition precedent to maintaining an action on the reward. Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496. Nor does a right to terminate a contract, subject to a liability for damages, entitle one party to alter its terms on giving notice to the other. Gillett v. Bowman, 43 Mich. 477. - Unless the contract so provides, the demand of one of the parties thereto, that the other shall perform his agreement, need not be in writing. Colby v. Reed, 99 U S. 560.
either party, he who is to * have the "benefit of the thing should give notice to him who is to do it, that the event has occurred, unless from its own nature it must become known to that party when it happens; or, perhaps, unless it is as likely to be known to the party who is to do the act required by the contract, as to him for whose benefit it is to be done. The rule in respect to demand rests upon the same principle with that in respect to notice. It may be requisite, either from the stipulations of the parties, or from the peculiar nature of the contract; but where not so requisite, he who has promised to do anything, must perform his promise in the prescribed time and in the prescribed way; or, if none be prescribed, in a reasonable time and a reasonable way, without waiting to be called upon.
Notice to an agent has been fully considered in the first volume. It may be well to remark here, however, that notice, whether directly to a principal, or through an agent, may be constructive only; but the construction which should give effect to a notice, would be more closely restricted if an agent intervened.
We apprehend that constructive notice may be of two kinds. In one, some notice or knowledge of a fact is proved, which would imply to a reasonable man certain other facts, or would lead a person of ordinary caution into an inquiry which would certainly disclose those facts. (f) The other kind of constructive notice exists, when actual notice was attempted, or when sufficient means of the exercise of his option, as to which he had selected. But this principle holds even more strongly in the present case; for not only do the terms of the covenant apply to all actually existing companies of the sort, but to all that might, at any future time subsequent to the date of the deed, be established within the bills of mortality. Now that is a condition which appears to me so perfectly indefinite, that notice ought to be given by the plaintiff of his having determined his choice; and I think therefore, that he was at least bound to give notice that a policy of insurance had been effected by him at such a particular office; it might then perhaps, be the duty of the defendant to inquire at that office into the nature and terms of the policy which had been there effected." See also Haule v. Hemyng, Vin. Abr. Condition (A. d.), pi. 15; s. c. nom. Henning's case, Cro. Jac. 432. So in Graddon v. Price, 2 C. & P. 610, it was held, that a performer who is called on to resume, in consequence of the illness of another, a part in which by previous performances she has acquired celebrity, is entitled to reasonable notice previous to the time of performance, such notice to be proportioned to the reputation at stake. In Haverley v. Leighton, 1 Bulstr. 12, the defendant promised the plaintiff's intestate, that if he borrowed £100 of B, he would pay him the same sum, upon the same conditions, as they between them should agree upon, and notice of such agreement was held not necessary. So in Bradley v. Toder, Cro. Jac. 228, and Fletcher v. Pynsett, Cro. Jac. 102, where the promise was in consideration that the plaintiff would marry such a woman, the defendant would give him £I00, notice of the marriage was held not necessary.
(f) Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare, 43,1 Phillips, 253; Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & K719, Sugden on V. & P. 1052. It is intimated in Jones v. Smith, as reported in 1 Phillips, 254, that courts of equity are now disposed to restrain rather than enlarge the law of constructive notice.
•7. Of Impossibility of Performance. *672
It has been somewhat questioned, how far the impossibility of doing what a contract requires, is a good defence against an action for the breach of it. If the performance of a contract becomes impossible by the act of God, that is, by a cause which could not possibly be attributed to the promisor, and this impossibility was not among the probable contingencies which a prudent man should have foreseen and provided for, it should seem that this would be a sufficient defence. (g) But to make the act of God a defence, it must amount to an impossibility of performance by the promisor; mere hardship or difficulty will not suffice. (h)1 So the noncannot be done, and the impossibility is not only certain but perfectly obvious to the promisee, as, if the promise were to build a common dwelling-house in one day, such a contract must be void for its inherent absurdity. (k) And impossibility is a good defence where it arises even indirectly from the act of the promisee; as where one contracted to excavate land and replace it in a certain way, and the promisee directed him to put the earth taken out on the land of another man, who would not permit it to be taken away again, the contractor was held excused from replacing the earth, and permitted to recover for the rest of the work. (kk)
 
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