Baker, 5 B. & Ad. 797 ; Hart v. Talmadge, 2 Day, 381. Young v. Hall, 4 Ga. 95, is a strong case to show that the defendant need not intend to derive any benefit from his fraud in order to render him liable. See Stiles v. White, 11 Met. 356; Weatherford v. Fishback, 3 Scam. 170. In Watson v. Poulson, Exch. 1851, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 585, it was held, that if a man tells an untruth, knowing it to be such, in order to induce another to alter his condition, who does accordingly alter it, and thereby sustains damage, the party making the false statement is liable in an action for deceit, although, in making the false representation, no fraud or injury was intended by him. Murray v. Mann, 2 Exch. 538, is to the same effect. See also Turnbull v. Gadsden, 2 Strobh. Eq. 14; Smith v. Mitchell, 6 Ga. 458.

(f) Collins v. Evans, 5 Q. B. 820; Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 92; Rawlings v. Bell, 1 C. B. 951; Thorn v. Bigland, 8 Exch. 725, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 470; Ormrod v. Huth,14 M.& W. 651. In this last case, cotton was sold by sample, upon a repreobvious reasons, be deemed more important, and exert a greater influence, than if it lie without the contract, and be connected with it only collaterally, and by force of circumstances. On a ground somewhat similar, a distinction has been drawn between extrinsic and intrinsic circumstances, which may sometimes be of practical use. The rule seems to be, that a concealment or misrepresentation as to extrinsic facts, which, by affecting the market value of things sold, or in any such way, affects the contract, is not fraudulent, while the same concealment of defects in the articles themselves would be fraudulent. (j) But it is perhaps enough to say of this, that a fraud relating to external and collateral matters, is treated by the law with less severity than one which refers to things internal and essential.

1 That an innocent misrepresentation by a seller of the extent of the boundaries of land is a fraud in law which will justify a purchaser in recouping damages when sued for the price, see Baughman v. Gould, 45 Mich. 481.

If the statement be in fact false, and be uttered for a fraudulent purpose, which is in fact accomplished, it has the whole effect of fraud in annulling the contract, although the person uttering the statement did not know it to be false, but believed it to be true. (g) If the falsehood be known to the party making the statement, malice or self-interest will be inferred. (h) * A party will not be held liable as for fraud, if the statement be of a matter collateral to the contract, unless it is proved to have been made fraudulently. (i) If a misrepresentation be embodied in a contract, it would, for sentation that the bulk corresponded with the samples, but no warranty was taken by the purchaser, and the bulk of the cotton turned out to be of inferior quality, and to have been falsely packed, though not by the seller. Held, that an action on the case for a false and fraudulent representation was not maintainable without showing that such representation was false to the knowledge of the seller, or that he acted fraudulently or against good faith in making it. And Tindal, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, said: "The rule which is to be derived from all the cases appears to us to be, that where, upon the sale of goods, the purchaser is satisfied without requiring a warranty (which is a matter for his own consideration), he cannot recover upon a mere representation of the quality by the seller, unless he can show that the representation was bottomed in fraud. If, indeed, the representation was false, to the knowledge of the party making it, this would in general be conclusive evidence of fraud; but if the representation was honestly made, and believed at the time to be true by the party making it, though not true in point of fact, we think this does not amount to fraud in law, but that the rule of caveat emptor applies, and the representation itself does not furnish a ground of action. And although the cases may in appearance raise some difference as to the effect of a false assertion or representation of title in the seller, it will be found, on examination, that in each of those cases there was either an assertion of title embodied in the contract, or a representation of title which was false to the knowledge of the seller. The rule we have drawn from the cases appears to us to be supported so clearly by the early, as well as the more recent, decisions, that we think it unnecessary to bring them forward in review; but to satisfy ourselves with saying, that the exception must be disallowed, and the judgment of the Court of Exchequer affirmed." See also Tryon v. Whitmarsh, I Met 1; Stone v. Denny, 4 Met. 151; Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69; Young v. Covell, 8 Johns. 25; Hopper v. Sisk, 1 Smith (Ind.), 102,1 Carter, 176; Fooks v. Waples, 1 Harring. (Del.) 131; Boyd v. Browne, 6 Barr, 316; Lord v. Goddard, 13 How. 198 ; Weeks v. Burton, 7 Vt. 67 ; Wells v. Jewett, 11 How. Pr. Rep. 242, 254; Ashlin v. White, 1 Holt, 387; Shrewsbury v. Blount, 2 Man. & G. 475. Many cases, however, seem to hold, that a false statement of a material fact, though made bond fide, will avoid a contract, and especially if the statement be of a fact which the defendant ought to know, and which the other party had a right to expect the defendant did know. See Buford v. Caldwell, 3 Mo. 477; Snyder v. Findley, Coxe, 48; Thomas v. McCann, 4 B. Mon. 601; Lockridge v. Foster, 4 Scam. 569; Parham v. Randolph, 4 How. Miss. 435; Dunbar v. Bonesteel, 3 Scam. 32; Miller v. Howell, 1 id. 499; Craig v. Blow, 3 Stew. 448; Van Arsdale v. Howard, 5 Ala. 596; Munroe v. Pritchett, 16 Ala. 785; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662.

(g) Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401.

(h) Thus, in Collins v. Denison, 12 Met. 549, it was held, that in an action for deceit in the sale of a horse, when proof is given that the defendant knowingly made false representations to the plaintiff concerning the horse, at the time of the sale, and that the plaintiff was induced by those representations to buy the horse, and confiding in them did buy him, the jury are authorized and required to find, that the defendant made the representations with the intent thereby to induce the plaintiff to buy the horse; and the plaintiff cannot legally be required to give any further proof of such intent of the defendant. See Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B. 197; Boyd v. Browne, 6 Barr, 310.