They who have no mind, "cannot agree in mind" with another; and, as this is the essence of a contract, they cannot enter into a contract. But there is more difficulty when we consider the case of those who are of unsound mind, partially and temporarily; and inquire how the question may be affected by the cause of this unsoundness.

Mere mental weakness, or inferiority of intellect, will not incapacitate a person from making a valid contract; nor is it easy to define the state of mind which will have this effect. There must be such a condition of insanity or idiocy, as, from its character or intensity, disables him from understanding the nature and effect of his acts, and therefore disqualifies him from transacting business and managing his property. (aa)1 And an adult person although of unsound mind can become liable on an implied contract for necessaries.2

(aa) Dennett v. Dennett,44 N. H. 531; Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen, 1; Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind.

231; Hovey v. Hovey, 55 Me. 256; Coleman v. Frazer, 3 Bush, 300.

1 For this reason a monomaniac's deed cannot be set aside when his monomania had no reference to the transaction of which the conveyance was the result and does not affect his business judgment. Burgess v. Pollock, 53 Ia. 273. Even though the deed was voluntary. Kidder v. Stevens, 60 Cal. 414.

2 Howard v. Digby, 4 D. M. & G. 798; Wentworth v. Tubb, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 171; 6 Jur. 980; 2 Y. & C. Ch. 537; Williams v. Wentworth, 5 Beav. 325; In re Rhodes, 44 Ch. D. 94; Ex parte Northington, Ala. S. C. 400; Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; Cape Elizabeth v. Lombard, 72 Me. 492; Hallett v. Oakes, 1 Cush. 296; Kendall v. May, 10 Allen, 59; In re Renz, 79 Mich. 216; Reando v. Misplay, 90 Mo. 251; Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N. J. L. 207; LaRue v. Gilkyson, 4 Penn. St. 375; Blaisdell v. Holmes, 48 Vt. 492. So a lunatic is liable for money borrowed to pay his debts. Lancaster Co. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407; or of which he has had the benefit. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541. See Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133.

The case of In re Weaver, 21 Ch. D. 615, cast some doubt on the liability of a lunatic for necessaries, especially if the person dealing with the lunatic knew of the lunacy, but this case was expressly disapproved in In re Rhodes, 44 Ch. D. 94. Cotton, L. J , said in the latter case; "It is asked, can there be an implied contract by a person who cannot himself contract in express terms. The answer is, that what the law implies on the part of such a person is an obligation which has been improperly termed a contract to repay money spent in supplying necessaries. I think the expression ' implied contract' is erroneous and very unfortunate."

It was once held that no man could discharge himself from his liability under a contract by proof that when he made it he was not of sound mind; on the ground that no man should be permitted to stultify himself.(a) This is not now the law, either in England or this country. If one enters into a contract while deprived of reason, and afterwards recovers his reason, he may repudiate that contract. (b)1 It is said that an insane person * may be arrested at common law, in a civil action. (c) We have much doubt of this as a rule, at least in this country.

(a) Litt. §§ 405, 406 , Beverley's case, 4 Rep. 126; Stroud v. Marshall, Cro. E. 398; Cross v. Andrews, id. 622. But this was contrary to the most ancient authorities. See 2 Bl. Com. 291. - In Waring v. Waring, 12 Jur. 947 (1848), the nature and the degrees of insanity are very fully considered.

(b) In Core v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623, the action was assumpsit by the indorsee against the indorser of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that when he indorsed the bill he was so intoxicated as to be unable to comprehend the meaning, nature, or effect of the indorsement; of which the plaintiff at the time of the indorsement had notice. Held, to be a good answer to the action. Parke, B.: " Where the party, when he enters into the contract, is in such a state of drunkenness as not to know what he is doing, and particularly when it appears that this is known to the other party, the contract is void altogether, and he cannot be compelled to perform it. A person who takes an obligation from another under such circumstances is guilty of actual fraud. The modern decisions have qualified the old doctrine, that a man shall not be allowed to allege his own lunacy or intoxication, and total drunkenness is now held to be a defence. See Matthews v. Baxter, L. R. 8 Ex. 132; Mitchell v. Kingman, ."» Pick. 431; Webster v. Woodford, 3 Day, 90; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Lang v. Whidden, 2 N. H. 435; Seaver v Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 434; Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N. Y. 260; McCreight v. Aiken, 1 Rice, 56; Yates v. Boen, 2 Stra. 1104; Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns. 503; Owing's case, 1 Bland, 377; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Munf. 466; Fitzgerald '•. Reed, 9 Sm. & M. 94. And an administrator may avoid a contract by showing the insanity of the testator at the time of making it. Lazell v. Pinnick, 1 Tyler, 247. And it is no answer that the same party when contracting was not apprised of the other's insanity, and did not suspect it, and did not overreach such insane person, or practise any fraud and unfairness upon him. Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304. And the dictum of Lord Tenterden, in Brown v. Joddrell, 1 Mood. & M. 105, to the contrary, is inconsistent with modern decisions. The modern rule seems to be somewhat qualified in Morris v. (lav, 8 Jones, L. 216.

(c) Person v. Warren, 14 Barb 488; Bush v. Pettiboue, 4 Comst. 300.

But such an obligation will not be imposed upon the lunatic if necessaries were furnished him on the credit of another, or without intention of charging the lunatic In re Rhodes, supra; Mass. Gen. Hospital v. Fairbanks, 129 Mass. 78.